The philosophy-form is not a simple effect, as deconstruction would have it it is, on the contrary, divided (transcendental-real and transcendental-empirical).
The dyad undoes the system-form in two unilateral temporalities. The subject is Real via the cloning of its essence, and the Real is subject when it is occasionally solicited by sufficient or non-reduced philosophy. We cannot say that the subject is a supplement to Man’s Real. Man is a unilateral duality, without a divided One, whether in its capacity as Real or as subject. Duality belongs to the Real, which is immediately non-anonymous because it is Man, and it belongs to the transcendental subject. This Outside is an immanent a priori, which makes an a priori understanding of the philosophizable unknown to and impossible for philosophy.ħ.2 It is philosophy that is dualyzed, not the Real itself. It consists of an operation that is not internal/external but immanent in itself and therefore heteronomous for philosophy. It comes from Nowhere and has No Time, the One-Stranger is utopic and uchronic, that is to say it is celestial (and not extra-terrestrial) and eternal (and not outside of time). Unilateralism acts as a radically immanent One-Stranger that does not itself come from the system, nor from its immediate exterior like an enclosure beyond an enclosure, nor even from further afar like an otherness with Judaic emphasis. It is the “vision” in the vision-in-One, a unique intentionality driven by a single impulse, like a drive that renders philosophy impossible precisely because it expresses philosophy as the philosophy. It is immanent without being relative to immanence. It is indeed otherness, but in a unique sense. 6.2 Unilateralism has another structure than the one provided by an exaggerated and doubled otherness. They have this access even without taking into account the aporias of entry, exit, and return. We avoid the spontaneous and empirical self-donation of philosophy as a signifier to which access is only granted and assured by Writings and Texts-that also is to say by religion and perhaps religious sophism-because subjects have a rightful and legitimate access to philosophy as the object of their struggle. Thus we uphold and maintain that philosophy is given to subjects as the object of their struggle. The vision-in-One acts according to a radical unbalance, one without return, and it never ceases to come as Stranger or Messiah, as a permanent struggle against the philosophical spontaneity of the world. The balance between possibility and impossibility in the vision-in-One is an immanent equilibrium, which is not evened out by equilibrium. Its impossibility is immanent or radical, its possibility-or its a priori givenness as phenomenon-is unilatness as phenomenon-is unilateral and therefore a complete Stranger to auto-donational philosophy. The philosophizable does not appear out of nowhere, since it comes in and as the form of a unilateral Outside specific to immanence.Ĥ.2 Acting as an a priori, the vision-in-One is another combination of the possibility and the impossibility of philosophy.
The system’s a priori condition of being-given is the Whole that-even if it is indeterminate, imaginary, or illusorily self-sufficient-is identified as philosophizable. The primary and immanent exclusion of all authority (not only “objectifying” authority but authority in the form of “actualization” or “realization,” or a “doubly objectifying” authority that posits the thing itself as independent or as being ) amounts to the impossibility of a transcendental or metalinguistic account of radical immanence (which is nevertheless capable of thinking axiomatically or without reflexivity).
It is not an essential or fundamental point of departure that has authority over itself, nor is it an assumed and self-legislating symptom that needs to be deconstructed. Because of its theoretical or phenomenal status, the constitution is both a material and a symptom. Above all, the system is a material constitution, for it is immanently given prima facie or a priori (in the vision-in-One). Rather, it is philosophy as a system of thought, specifically as a principle of enclosure that cannot in any way be reduced to its texts. The system to be examined is indeed constituted, but it is not just any textual system. It is not to be examined from the outside or from above with authority as though it were an organization of parts assumed to be self-sufficient or given in and for themselves. 2.2 First of all, the given to be examined is not a textual constitution that supplies its own principle of enclosure, which is in itself textual.